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Die Sprache ist gerade insofern Object und selbstständig, als sie Subject und abhängig ist. 
Denn sie hat nirgends, auch in der Schrift nicht, eine bleibende Stätte, sondern muss immer 
im Denken aufs neue erzeugt werden, und folglich ganz in das Subject übergehen […]. 
(Humboldt, 1822/1996, p. 226) 
1.1 Language Change Beyond Synchrony and Diachrony 
There seems to be little doubt that languages “change”. However, proving this common 
assumption with evidence from our daily life is rather difficult. One might refer to neologisms 
as a source of new lexical material that enter a language or loanwords from other languages that 
become regularly used in colloquial speech. The word touché, for example, which was 
originally used in French to acknowledge a hit in fencing, is now used sarcastically in colloquial 
English to show that the argument from the interlocutor is valid and to acknowledge the 
interlocutor’s victory. Thus, the borrowed word has acquired a new semantic and pragmatic 
function. 
This evidence is mostly not sufficient to proof the hypothesis that languages change. Rather, 
these are instances of synchronic variation in a speech community and cannot be regarded to 
display language change. From a synchronic perspective, the only evidence we can find is that 
there are differences a) in the ways to express an idea1, hence the notion of variation, and b) an 
unequal dissemination and acceptability of items. The latter can be illustrated with an example 
of grammaticalization in German, whereby the verb “bekommen” is losing its lexical meaning 
‘to receive’ and takes over the role of an auxiliary in the passive construction. 
(1)   a) Maria bekommt ein Buch geschenkt. 
b) Maria bekommt den Führerschein entzogen. 
c) Maria bekommt geholfen.  
Most German speakers would accept a) where “bekommen” still has the basic meaning of 
‘to receive something’. The variant b) has lost this semantic because Mary does not receive, but 
lose something, hence b) shows stronger influence of grammaticalization. Finally, variant c) is 
predicted to be least accepted by native speakers. However, not all speakers agree equally which 
forms are acceptable.2 This illustrates that changes spread unequally in a speech community 
 
1 „Idea“ is used here as the mental concept that is associated with a sound pattern, hence the signifié in 
Saussure’s model of the linguistic sign. 
2 This seems to be the reason why innovative language use is often stigmatized by certain groups of speakers. 
They have a lower acceptability regarding this one variant and therefore attach stigma to it. Laymen discussions 
of language change likewise reflect the phenomenon that novel forms are somehow “worse” than the old ones – 
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and that variation in the expression of an idea (here: the passive construction) is the basis for 
studying language change from a synchronic perspective. Consequently, it is not surprising that 
ongoing changes are studied by sociolinguists who analyze the spread of a novel form in a 
speech community. 3 
It follows that we only have scarce evidence for the claim that languages change from the 
view of the language state.4 It is necessary to compare language states in a sufficient time 
interval in order to trace language change. We are therefore compelled to characterize language 
change as a historical phenomenon  (cf. Croft, 2000, p. 1) and subsequently enter the field of 
diachronic linguistics. The predominantly synchronic approach to linguistics in the Saussurean 
tradition could not, except for sociolinguistic research, contribute to the explanation of language 
change. Indeed, Saussure himself defined language as a conventional sign system, whose nature 
seems to resist any kind of modification because each state is the product of the former state.  
Saussure saw no reason why speakers would choose a different convention for communication 
than the one they obtained from their parents (cf. Saussure, 2014, 108f.). The famous comment 
on the question of language change reflects the aporia to explain it convincingly: “Time changes 
all things; there is no reason why language should escape this universal law” (Saussure, 2014, 
p. 113). 
1.2 Overview of the Literature – Some Accounts 
The question of why languages change has been widely discussed in the last 100 years,5 
producing many different approaches to explain the phenomenon. In the structuralist tradition 
the notion of language as a system has yielded different accounts of what the driving force of 
language change is. The concept of speech economy has been invoked several times in those 
frameworks (cf. Ronneberg-Sibold, 1988; Werner, 1989; Wurzel, 1997), most prominently by 
Jespersen (1894). In contrast to the prevailing conception of language change as decay in the 
nineteenth century, Jespersen offered a contrasting view on language change. According to him, 
 
an idea that reaches back to a notion of August Schleicher in the 19th century. He associated language change with 
decay, especially with reference to the emergence of analytical means to express grammatical functions; cf. the 
summary in Putschke (1998). 
3 It is beyond the scope of this study to outline the theories of language change developed by sociolinguists 
such as Labov (1994, 2020), Jim Milroy (2000), James Milroy (1997, 2003) and many other. Cf. also the 
conclusions drawn in Boas and Pierce (2020) 
4 Coseriu (1974, p. 12) argues similarly against the synchronic analysis of language change: “Ebensowenig 
wandelt sich die Sprache in der synchronischen Betrachtung, und ebensowenig ist es möglich, auf irgendeine 
Weise „den Wandel (als solchen) in der Synchronie nachzuweisen", denn der erste Schritt in dieser Art der 
Sprachbetrachtung besteht darin, bewußt von der Entwicklung und dem Wandel abzusehen.”  
5 Language change has been not only subject to debate in the last 100 years, of course, but its puzzlement is 




languages become more economical and therefore more efficient in the course of their 
development. The drift from a synthetic to an analytical language type is interpreted by 
Jespersen as improvement by economizing speech. While this radical view is not supported 
anymore because language change is not assumed to improve the language nor have a final end 
point, some theorists still use the notion of economy to explain processes of language change. 
More recent and sophisticated instances of those theories are, for example, optimality theory 
(see e.g. McMahon, 2000).  
In the context of the so-called pragmatic turn the role of the speaker was focused. The 
theories and concepts that emerged were subsequently also applied to historical linguistics and 
gave rise to a speaker-oriented approach to language change (on which see Coussé & Mengden, 
2014; Gvozdanovic, 1997). A quite different approach was taken by generativist linguists. The 
high variability of spoken speech that functions as the input material in the acquisition process 
is one reason that leads to differences in the children’s grammar compared to their parent’s 
grammar. Specifically, children have to infer the grammar (or at least certain parameters) from 
the heterogeneous data that the environment gives the learners access to, giving rise to slightly 
altered learner grammars. Thus, the generative approach locates language change in the 
acquisition process and thereby models it as differences in the grammars (e.g. Lightfoot, 1999).  
In the light of this theoretic pluralism the question of whether it is possible to unite the 
different approaches stood in the center.6 The major problem in synthesizing the theories 
seemed to be the fact that they all have quite different assumptions of what a language is. The 
structuralist notion sees language as an abstract system, while the generativist view locates 
language in the cognitive faculty of the speaker. Unlike any of these, the pragmatic approach 
views language as a communicative instrument to pursue certain goals.  
Eventually, a rather old theory was proposed as a new framework to synthesize the different 
approaches: Darwin’s evolutionary theory. This research paradigm is certainly among the most 
popular in current debates (for an overview and applications see Jäger, Eckardt, & Veenstra, 
2008; monographic presentations are e.g. Ritt, 2004, Lass, 1997; Mufwene, 2017). One of the 
notions that was proposed in the evolutionary paradigm is, for example, the notion of exaption 
in language change (e.g. Lass, 1997; van de Velde & Norde, 2016). Further, not immediately 
relevant discussions in the secondary literature will be indicated in the footnotes. 
It will be the goal of this study to draw the conclusions from three different language change 
theories to explain why languages change. The lexical and morpho-syntactic examples of 
 
6 As an example of the attempt to combine Wurzel’s markedness theory with Keller’s invisible-hand theory, 
see Wurzel (1997) and Keller (1994, p. 155). 
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language change briefly presented above seem to be generally easier to explain than 
phonological changes. I argue that sound change is harder to motivate than changes in any other 
level of language, because, as is generally known, phonemes are the smallest unit that separate 
words from another. They do not carry, unlike e.g. morphemes, a specific meaning, therefore 
the question of why phonemes change is particularly challenging.  
2. Methodology 
This study compares a structuralist theory (Wurzel’s markedness theory), a pragmatic theory 
(Keller’s invisible-hand theory) and an evolutionary theory (Croft, 2000) with reference to 
sound change. The aim is to compare the different strategies of the respective theories in 
explaining changes in the phonological system. In order to do that, I will consider one example 
of phonological change in the Old English period and try to apply the theories to this specific 
instance of sound change. It needs to be stressed, however, that the sound change from Old 
English has merely illustrative function. It is not the primary goal of this study to find the most 
convincing explanation for the sound change in question.  
The research question for this study can be stated as follows: How can the structuralist, 
pragmatic and evolutionary theory of language change explain sound change? It is obvious that 
we are interested in the different approaches these theories take in explaining sound change. In 
applying the theories to our sample change breaking in Old English (see chapter 3), we will be 
able to detect difficulties and contradictions, leading to a comparative evaluation of the three 
theories. Since theories are designed to make complex phenomena such as language change 
comprehensible, it is especially important to not lose oneself in the theoretical realm. The 
practical link to breaking in Old English will help us not to be ‘lured’ by the theoretical 
grounding. Highly formalized theories tend to be very popular because their way of abstracting 
from reality is often fascinating. The practical perspective will help us not to lose track of 
reality.  
This study aims at assessing the theories in terms of their explanatory power for sound 
change. This seems appropriate because the aim is to compare the explanations of sound change 
that these theories offer.  
The selection of the theories was not accidental. On the contrary, they are very different in 
nature in that their proponents stem from different traditions and schools. This was indeed 
intended because the evolutionary approach promises to incorporate different theories. We may 
observe in which way an evolutionary approach is successful in doing so. 
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The sound change breaking was chosen because this seems a rather interesting case. Firstly, 
diphthongizations are hardly instances of speech economy, which is often invoked to explain 
sound change. Secondly, breaking is a very important sound change for Old English, as will be 
shown, since it has far-reaching consequences for the morphological system in Old English. 
However, only very few theoretical works have tried to motivate breaking.7 Traditional 
accounts content themselves with the description of the change (e.g. Campbell, 1959). 
The paper is structured as follows. The next chapter will present and, as far as necessary, 
discuss the sample sound change breaking. Chapter 4 discusses the epistemological problems 
of change and explanation, both of which lie at the heart of language change theories. In the 
main part of this study, each theory is presented and then discussed with the sample sound 
change (chapter 5). Chapter 6 discusses the findings, followed by a conclusion and a general 
outlook (chapter 7).  
3. Presentation of the Sample: Breaking in Old English 
Before the theories are presented and can be applied to the sample sound change, it is necessary 
to summarize the problem of the sound change under discussion. We will compare the sound 
change called “breaking” in the pre-Old English period as it is presented in different grammars 
of Old English.  
Breaking is one of the most important and disputed sound change in the history of English. 
It is agreed that breaking is one of the very early sound changes leading to the Old English 
period (see also below). According to the textbook account, breaking generally refers to the 
diphthongization of a front vowel in certain environments (cf. Mitchell & Robinson, 2012, 
p. 38). The relevant changes can be stated as follows. 
i) Before -h, -hC8, -rC: 
æ > ea, e.g. bearn (‘child’), eahta (‘eight’), seah (‘he saw’) 
e > eo, e.g. feoh (‘cattle’), eolh (‘elk’), weorþan (‘become’) 
ii) Before -l9C, but not -lh:  
æ > ea, e.g. healp (1st pret. ‘help’), eall (‘all’) 
iii) Before -h and -hC 
 
7 Among those is Smith (2007). 
8 C stands for any consonant. 
9 The l is supposed to be pronounced back in the throat, hence can be compared to what is known as dark [ɫ]. 
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ī > īo > very often ēo, e.g. betwēoh (‘between’), lēoht (‘light’)  
(Mitchell & Robinson, 2012, 38f.) 
Note that this is not a phonetic transcription but a graphemic representation. For 
convenience, only long vowels are marked with the diacritic. In addition to long ī in point iii) 
above, short i also breaks regularly before [w] (cf. niowul ‘prostrate’). Short e also breaks before 
[w] as in eowu ‘ewes’, but [w]-breaking is less regular than in the other environments and shall 
not bother us here. It is disputed whether diphthongization before [w] in fact belongs to breaking 
or is part of another change.10 However, long ē never undergoes breaking in West Saxon and 
long ǣ is only regular before [x] as in nēah ‘near’ (< *næh) (cf. Campbell, 1959, p. 58).  
Indeed, one fundamental question is the pronunciation of the diphthongs produced by 
breaking. The cited textbook (Mitchell & Robinson, 2012) assumes <ea> to be realized [æa].11 
This seems to be important to understand the general “mechanism” of this change better. What 
seems to happen is an assimilatory process between the front vowel and the consonant(s) 
following it. The consonants that trigger breaking are all articulated in the back of the throat: 
<l> was presumably dark [ɫ], <h> was realized either [x] or [ç] word-internally and word-
finally,12 and <r>  either velar, retroflex or uvular (cf. Lass, 1994, p. 49; Smith, 2007, 98ff.). 
The fact that they are all ‘back’ environments “would naturally prompt insertion of a ‘transition’ 
vowel of back quality as an assimilatory response to the front-to-back movement” (Lass, 1994, 
p. 49). Lass identifies this vowel as being originally [u]. After [u] has been inserted between 
the front vowel and the consonant(s), we get for <æ> in i), for example, a cluster like [-æuCC], 
for <e> [euC] respectively, etc. It is evident that this is only one step in the process of breaking, 
whereby the articulatory distance is abridged by the insertion of a back vowel. 
The second step involves what Lass (1994, 50f.)  dubbed Diphthong Height Harmony 
(DHH). The inserted vowel [u] takes on the height of the front vowel: 
DHH then is a condition on complex nuclei that both elements must be of the same height, and 
that the second assimilates to the first. The condition of course holds by default of long vowels, 
but changes diphthongs in /-u/ with nonhigh first elements. (Lass, 1994, p. 51) 
 
10 Campbell (1959, p. 90) lists eowu in the context of Back Mutation, noting that “[a]ll dialects provide 
instances of the back umlaut of an e produced by i-umlaut. After the latter change took place, a back vowel might 
be placed in the syllable after the e by suffix transference and cause back umlaut.” Similarly, Smith (2007, p. 93) 
sees [w]-diphthongization as an instance of i-mutation. We adopt this view here and do not consider 
diphthongization before [w] to be part of breaking.  
11 For an exhaustive discussion of OE diphthongs and their long and short variants, see Lass (1994, 45ff.), 
also Lass and Anderson (1975, 75ff.). It is discussed whether short diphthongs were in fact monophthongs. For a 
comprehensive reference list on the issue, see also Smith (2007, p. 94). 
12 Word-internally, the grapheme <h> has a palatal and a velar variant in Old English. Which allophone is 
relevant in a word depends on the front or back quality of the neighboring vowel (cf. Mitchell and Robinson, 2012, 
p. 15). Word-initially, <h> is always [h].  
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Our consonant cluster for <æ> above, according to the DHH, develops to [-æaCC]. The 
inserted vowel [u] changes its height according to the preceding vowel æ to a. The development 
of eald ‘old’ can illustrate this succession: */ald/ [aɫd] > [æɫd] (Anglo-Frisian Brightening) > 
[æuɫd] (Breaking) > [æaɫd] (DHH) (cf. Lass, 1994, p. 51).  
This example, beside modelling breaking in two subsequent steps, shows us that Anglo-
Frisian Brightening (AFB) produces the low front vowels that are subject to breaking. This is 
held as evidence for the fact that breaking must have occurred after AFB because it is fed by 
the latter’s output.  
Campbell’s classical grammar of Old English (Campbell, 1959, p. 54) presents breaking 
together with retraction. Here it is also assumed that a vocalic glide – but not necessarily [u] – 
developed in the movement from the front vowel to the back consonant. Campbell assumes this 
glide to have originally been a rounded sound.13 Textual evidence seems to support this since 
<eu>, <iu> are found for ē̆, ī̆ respectively, later they develop to <eo>, <io>. There are some 
logical arguments that speak in favor of considering breaking and retraction as being part of 
one change, as Campbell does. Firstly, both glide insertion and retraction are instances of 
assimilation processes that abridge the articulatory distance between back consonants and front 
vowels. Another evidence supporting the closeness of breaking and retraction comes from 
West-Saxon where e breaks before [w], e.g. cnēowes ‘knee’ (gen.sg.), but æ retracts to a as in 
awel ‘hook’, gesawen ‘seen’ etc. (cf. Lass, 1994, p. 50). In pairing retraction and breaking, 
forms that are not affected by breaking (e.g. those in Anglian dialects) are accounted for by 
retraction.14 
While it was said that forms that do not show breaking in the environments where we would 
expect it can be ascribed to retraction, many irregularities still remain. Breaking is a complex 
and by no means always ‘regular’ change (cf. Lass, 1994, p. 48). Sometimes palatal *i,* j in the 
following syllable prevented breaking. For instance, breaking of i failed in the [-iwi] group 
(spiwe ‘vomiting’, niwel ‘prostrate’) (cf. Campbell, 1959, p. 59).  
Moreover, while geminates also trigger breaking, ll that stems from West-Germanic 
gemination does not have the same effect as lC in ii) above (e.g. tellan ‘tell’, sellan ‘sell’ < 
 
13 An exception is ǣ̆ from PGmc *au. After ǣ̆ the glide was generally unrounded and hence produced ǣa. 
Hogg (2011, p. 82) describes the glide as a non-low, non-syllabic back vowel, so either o or u. 
14 More recent grammars of Old English do acknowledge the possibility of retraction and breaking as being 
part of one historical change, but opt for an account that separates them: “Thus it is possible and reasonably 
plausible that those two sound changes were really part of a single historical event. It might seem more economical 
to suggest that retraction of *æ before *lC was part of the more general retraction of *æ when a single consonant 
or geminate and a back vowel followed […]. But retraction before *lC occurred regardless of the following vowel, 
and even in monosyllables […], and since the conditioning of the two changes was quite different, it is almost 
certain that they were separate historical events.” (Ringe and Taylor, 2014, p. 186) 
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*saljan, hell ‘hell’ < *halj- vs. feallan ‘fall’, eall ‘all’) (cf. Campbell, 1959, p. 54). This shows 
that the origin of the consonant cluster is relevant. It is unclear, however, why geminate ll that 
stems from West-Germanic gemination behaves differently than the remaining geminates. 
Hogg (2011, p. 83) gives evidence that geminated l from West-Germanic gemination failed to 
trigger breaking because “the palatalizing effect of following /j/ gave [ll] rather than [ɫɫ].” Thus, 
in this case geminated l was not a ‘back’ consonant. This would again speak for an assimilation 
process that drives breaking. 
Beside these observations of ‘structural irregularity’ there are also forms that match the 
breaking environments but simply do not undergo the change, e.g. ærn ‘house’, bærn ‘burn!’ 
(cf. Hogg, 2011, p. 92). Those cases simply cannot be accounted for.  
There are several reflexes of breaking in the morphological system of Old English. As is 
well known, sound changes can lead to “long chains of ‘cooperating’ mutations that can distort 
the original structure of paradigms” (Lass, 1994, p. 52). In particular, this manifests itself in the 
fact that breaking has obscured the original ablaut pattern of the strong verbs of class III that 
originally had e in the present and æ in the preterite singular. Since the original root contained 
a nasal or liquid, the environment for AFB, which produced æ, was given. Subsequently, the 
roots were subject to breaking as in weorpan ‘throw’, pret. sg. wearp.  
Another consequence of breaking affects the weak verbs of class 1 with root-final l and a 
syncopated preterite. Verbs like syllan ‘give’ show breaking in the preterite (sealde). Similarly, 
the wa- and wō- stems show breaking in the nom.acc.sg. because of the /-rw/ cluster: bearu 
‘grove’, searu ‘device’ (cf. Hogg, 2011, p. 92). 
It is worth to discuss the place of breaking in the chronology of changes. We have seen 
above that AFB produces the low front vowels that undergo breaking in certain environments. 
Consequently, AFB feeds breaking and must have occurred before. Equally uncontroversial is 
the assumption that i-Mutation must have occurred after breaking because it acts on its products: 
*heardjan > EWS15 hierdan ‘make hard’ (cf. Campbell, 1959, 107f.; cf. Hogg, 2011, p. 92). A 
later change which reverses the outcome of breaking by monophthongization, called Anglian 
smoothing, is particularly interesting. Before the back consonants /k, ʒ, x/ the vowels <ea, eo, 
io>, both the long and short ones, became <æ, e, i> respectively (cf. Campbell, 1959, p. 93), 
thereby reversing the process of breaking. This also confirms the assumption that breaking was 
a temporally framed event rather than an ongoing process. In borrowed words, for instance, 
 
15 EWS stands for Early West-Saxon 
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breaking no longer occurred by the late West-Saxon period (cf. pæll ‘pallium’) (cf. Smith, 2007, 
p. 96). 
Summarizing the points, we have seen that breaking diphthongized the front vowels æ, i, e 
to ea, io, eo respectively. The long and short vowels were affected equally except for ē that 
never breaks. Breaking is triggered by the consonant clusters rC, hC and, although more 
restricted, lC. Breaking is assumed to have proceeded in two subsequent steps. The first step 
was the epenthesis of a vocalic glide between the front vowel and the back consonants [r, ɫ, x]. 
The second step involved assimilation of the glide to the height of the front vowel.  
It is disputed whether breaking and retraction are part of one change. Adopting this view 
allows to account for several cases, especially in the Anglian dialect, where breaking failed to 
act in the expected environments. Chronologically, AFB must have occurred before breaking 
and i-umlaut followed it. A change in late Old English called smoothing reversed the process 
of breaking by monophthongization.  
Before we can endeavor to explain this complex sound change called breaking with the 
different theories, we need to be clear about what an explanation actually is in the context of 
language change theories. 
4. Epistemological Problems of Change and Explanations 
First, we need to consider what assumptions are made by a “language change theory”. Trivially, 
the term refers to a specific theory that tries to explain language change. Before we discuss 
what to explain means when we deal with language change, we need to think about another 
assumption made by any language change theory, which is the fact that languages change.  
As was briefly noted in the introduction, our evidence from everyday life to justify this 
claim is very scarce. However, there is little doubt among linguists that languages change. If 
we take into account the ongoing changes from a synchronic point of view, this does not count 
as evidence for language change. Rather, these can be seen as synchronic variation. How do 
we know that the variation of each generation does not just die as the old speaker generation is 
substituted by the new one, leaving the language unchanged?  
It is necessary, therefore, to rely on documents of the past – witnesses, as Lass (1997, p. 21) 
calls them. Subsequently, these witnesses are interpreted and compared with another language 
state, thereby trying to track changes in the language. In the first place, the task of the linguist 
needs to be the exegesis of historical texts. For Lass (1997, p. 18) it follows that all historical 
linguistics is historiography. A given object of the past is only a potential witness and needs to 
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be interpreted as a historical document. We call these types of historical knowledge witnesses16 
(ibid., p. 42).  
Unlike witnesses, which are generated by interpretations, there is also an indirect way of 
having access to the past. This knowledge can derive either from theory of the present world or 
from metaphors. The former type makes several assumptions that tend to be taken for granted 
but should not. Firstly, it has to be noted that “historical linguistics is a branch of linguistics, 
constrained by non-historical linguistic knowledge and theory” (Lass, 1997, p. 27). In trying to 
apply knowledge of the general discipline of linguistics onto the historical domain of it, we 
assume two facts about our world in general. These two Uniformity Principles are presented in 
their linguistic rephrasing. 
General Uniformity Principle 
No linguistic state of affairs (structure, inventory, process, etc.) can have been the case only 
in the past. 
Uniform Probabilities Principle 
The (global, cross-linguistic) likelihood of any linguistic state of affairs (structure, inventory, 
process, etc.) has always been roughly the same as it is now. (Lass, 1997, 28f.) 
Accepting these two principles is inevitable for any diachronic enquiry. There is no other way 
of interpreting the past than to assume that the same laws that apply in the present also applied 
in past situations. To give a linguistic example, a sound sequence [mb] is easier to pronounce 
than a sequence [nb]. This must also have been the case in the past (see General Uniformity 
Principle). The probability that speakers in the past pronounced a sequence [nb] as [mb] must 
have been “roughly the same as it is now” (see Uniform Probabilities Principle). Although these 
principles are barely questioned, it is important to make them explicit.  
Besides projecting the insights into language gained by synchronic research onto the 
problem of language change, the uniformitarian hypothesis also maintains that variation has 
always been similarly structured as it is today. Sociolinguistically speaking, variation is 
expected to occur in a similar fashion in all levels of language in, say, Old English, as well as 
in Present-Day English. One popular reflex of this hypothesis in diachronic linguistics is the 
assumption that synchronic cross-linguistic variation is similarly structured as different 
historical language states within the same language. To put it differently, if we abstract away 
from the lexicon, Old English is to Present-Day English as English is to German.  
 
16 Lass (1997, p. 61) notes that written records often only give hints to what the spelling of a language in the 
past might have been. Whether these are merely lapses or meaningful evidence for changes is subject to careful 
research. This involves many of the interpretative and reconstructive methods of historical linguistics. 
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Still it remains unclear how we should imagine the process of a historical change. 
Translative conceptions of change would maintain that one form or structure simply becomes 
or turns into another (cf. Lass, 1997, p. 278). Conversely, the “structuralist-replacive” notion 
of change sees language change as a substitution of a former state. Accordingly, the first step 
is that the slot that is affected in the system is vacated due to an external factor.17 Subsequently, 
the empty slot is filled by the new form (cf. the notion of the Great-Vowel Shift).  
If we now assume that languages in fact do change, we arrive at the second, far more 
controversial assumption of a language change theory, namely that language change is 
explainable. Several questions arise when we try to define what “explain” actually means. In 
an earlier monograph, Lass (1980) discusses the epistemological problem of explaining 
language change, which lies at the heart of language change theories. Questions of why 
something happened “involve general principles, matters of theoretical interest, etc., and 
answering them represents a higher mode of achievement […]” (Lass, 1980, p. 1). With those 
abstract theories on the subject we are able to understand the phenomenon and can explain it 
(cf. ibid., p. 7). 
In principle there are “historical explanations” which Lass dubs the positivist view and there 
is the notion of the historian as a myth maker (cf. Lass, 1980, p. 2; 1997, p. 4). A myth is “in 
the widest sense […] a story or image that structures some epistemic field (knowledge, thought, 
belief) in a particular culture” (Lass, 1997, p. 4). The problem with myths in linguistic 
explanations is that they are notoriously independent of their truth value and hence cannot be 
taken to explain a complex phenomenon such as language change (cf. ibid., p. 5). Rather, we 
need explanations of the logical-deductive kind that use conditions and laws in their explanans 
to explain the explanandum.  
E= ‘John died after being decapitated’ 
C1 John’s head was cut off.  
L1 The heart will not beat if it is disconnected from the brain. 
L2 Persons whose hearts don’t beat die.  
E John died.                                                                                  (Lass, 1980, p. 10) 
These deductive explanations are the only true explanations but are unattainable in 
linguistics. Most importantly, in this explanation type the explanandum follows necessarily 
 
17 It is not always entirely clear what the initial cause of the process is. While the rest of the succession is 
completely internally motivated, the first change of the vacated slot is often accounted for by an external factor 
(cf. McMahon, 1994, p. 84) 
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from the conditions in the explanans (cf. Lass, 1980, p. 10). Linguistics lacks such universal 
“laws” and has to work with what can be called probabilistic explanations. The explanandum 
will then not follow logically from the explanans, “but rather with ‘high likelihood’” (ibid., 
p. 12). An important consequence of these probabilistic types of explanations is that they cannot 
predict the explanandum and therefore are always post hoc. Deductive explanations, on the 
other hand, can predict the explanandum.  
Instead of dismissing the undertaking to explain language change altogether, we should 
“accept a lower-key definition of explanation at a less elevated […] level” (McMahon, 1994, 
p. 45). A convincing but modest notion of explanation, then, would be that it constitutes “relief 
from puzzlement about some phenomenon” (ibid., p. 45). However, we need to be conscious 
about what kind of explanation a language change theory proposes, because this has several 
consequences for the generalizability of the explanative model. 
Finally, we need to be aware of what a language change theory in fact does. McMahon (1994, 
p. 44) maintains that, for example, the generativist accounts of sound change are “all more 
successful at describing what happened than why it happened, although they all claim, with 
varying degrees of conviction, that they are explaining language change” (emphasis original).18 
Similarly, the notions of lexical diffusion19 in the field of sound change and grammaticalization 
in morphosyntax are in fact only describing how the change proceeds. Lexical diffusion, if 
anything, may describe the way a sound change spreads, hence contributes to the transmission 
problem (cf. McMahon, 1994, p. 68). Likewise, grammaticalization describes pathways and 
“channels” that structures seem to follow.20 However, little is said in these theories on the 
motivation of a novel form in the first place. Another important distinction, therefore, seems to 
be the description of the change on the one hand and the motivation of the change on the other 
hand. 
5. Language Change Theories 
In the following, the three theories are outlined and it is discussed how these theories deal with 
the problem of the motivation of a sound change, i.e. why speakers innovate their language. 
Referring to our example of breaking in pre-Old English, we are specifically interested in the 
reasons that can be generated in these frameworks for diphthongizing the vowels <æ, e, i> to 
 
18 This is not to be misunderstood as a criticism of generativist explanations. Already early works of Chomsky 
(e.g., 1957) emphasize the difference between descriptions and explanations.  
19 Lexical diffusion argues that sound change does not affect all the respective phonemes at the same time but 
spreads gradually through the lexicon. This hypothesis stems from empirical observations according to which the 
most frequent words show a sound change first. See e.g. Phillips (2002). 
20 For an overview see Hopper and Traugott (2012). 
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<ea, eo, io> before consonant clusters involving <l, r, h>. With some of the problems of 
explaining sound change in mind, we can move on to present a structuralist theory that makes 
use of the notion of markedness.  
5.1 Structuralist Approaches: Grammatisch Initiierter Wandel 
Since the 1980s and 1990s, several researchers have worked on what can be called a “natural 
theory of linguistic change”.21 We can contextualize this approach in a larger debate in the 
course of the 20th century that started focusing on the language-internal potentials of explaining 
language change. Rather than scrutinizing the speakers and their environment, this so called 
“naturalistic theory” (Natürlichkeitstheorie)  searches for properties in the language system that 
are held as the initial cause of language change, hence the notion of Grammatisch initiierter 
Wandel proposed by Wolfgang Ullrich Wurzel (1994). Accordingly, in order to justify that the 
language system is the locus of language change, it is inevitable to assume a structuralist theory 
for this approach.  
Above all, structuralist notions of language assume that a language is a system whose signs 
are not distributed randomly but are structured in such a way that some signs have a close 
relation to others. Each element is constitutive for the whole, and it receives its function only 
through the system. Consider the model below as part of the consonant system of any language. 
p t k 
b d g 
z m x 
Figure 1: An exemplary phoneme inventory in the structuralist tradition. 
The relations between the phonemes /p t k/ in the first horizontal row is closer to each other 
than the phonemes /p b z/ in the first vertical row since /p t k/ share the same manner of 
articulation (plosive). Similarly, the vertical row /k g x/ shares the same place of articulation 
(velar) and is therefore more related to one another than, say, the row /t d m/. The fact that 
particular phonemes share a different degree of relatedness to other phonemes in a phonological 
system leads to a specific structure of the system.  
If a change in the system occurs and alters one group of phonemes, usually caused by some 
external factor, structuralist theory would predict subsequent changes in other parts of the 
 
21 Among the proponents of this theory are Stampe (1997), Ronneberg-Sibold (1988), Charles-James Bailey 
and Willi Mayerthaler.  
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system. For instance, when a change affects the voiceless plosives /p t k/ that bear a close 
relation and produces the fricatives /f θ x/,22 the phonological system is out of balance because 
the new fricatives merge with the old ones. While all subsequent changes to the first can be 
deduced logically as a reconfiguration of the system, the first, initial change is hard to motivate 
in a structuralist framework. This first change is often accounted for by an external factor (cf. 
McMahon, 1994, p. 31). Although Wurzel’s theory (1994) relies by and large on the classical 
structuralist linguistic theory, it is maintained that the initial impulse stems from the system as 
well, hence the term grammatisch initiierter Wandel. In order to make this plausible a further 
parameter is necessary, the parameter of markedness. 
5.1.1 Language Change as Reduction of Markedness 
Wurzel (1994, p. 27) regards the markedness principles (Markiertheitsprinzipien) as one of the 
fundamental concepts of his theory in that they  
legen fest, ,was Markiertheit ist‘, genauer gesagt, welche grammatischen Erscheinungen 
hinsichtlich welchen Parameters in welchem Grade markiert sind. Dabei sind phonologische, 
morphologische und syntaktische Markiertheitsprinzipien zu unterscheiden, die für die 
jeweiligen grammatischen Bereiche gelten. 
It follows that in this theory another layer is added on top of the language system, namely 
an evaluative layer of markedness. Forms can be marked in regard to one (phonological, 
morphological etc.) parameter. Language change, consequently, is defined as the reduction of 
markedness: “grammatisch initiierter Wandel [führt] immer von stärker markierten 
grammatischen Einheiten zu schwächer markierten grammatischen Einheiten […]. Das Wesen 
eines solchen Wandels besteht damit im Abbau von grammatischer Markiertheit” (Wurzel, 
1994, p. 27).  
At the same time, it has to be stressed that there is not a purely marked form. Rather, one 
form is marked regarding one specific parameter on a linguistic level. If language change is 
understood as reducing markedness, this is not to say that all marked forms in a system are 
necessarily eliminated (cf. Wurzel, 1994, p. 29). It is true, however, that language change is a 
directed process because the leading parameter is markedness; changes always lead to the 
reduction of markedness.  
Furthermore, one important property of markedness that results from the outline above is 
that it is gradable. Consider the examples in (2) for an illustration of unmarked and more marked 
forms in the formation of the plural in German. 
 
22 This example is part of the change called “Grimm’s Law”.  
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(2)      a) Frau – Frauen 
b) Vater – Väter 
c) Fenster – Fenster  
d) Elternteil – Eltern (adapted from Wurzel, 1994, p. 60f.) 
According to the second morphological parameter called “konstruktioneller Ikonismus”, 
which holds that semantically more complex concepts should be symbolized with more 
phonological material (cf. ibid., p. 60), a) is unmarked because the plural symbolizes its 
semantics by adding the suffix -en. The form in b) is more marked regarding this parameter 
because it shows umlaut rather than adding phonological material to the stem. The plurals of 
class c) that have zero affixation are marked because the category ‘number’ is not expressed 
anywhere and eventually, forms like d) are highly marked in that they are even counter-iconic 
because the singular is phonologically richer than the plural.  
Accordingly, this theory would assume that forms like d) that are most marked regarding 
this principle are most likely to be affected by a change. However, it is crucial that language 
change, that is, the reduction of markedness, acts only locally. Markedness cannot be 
eliminated; only markedness regarding one specific parameter can be reduced because “jeder 
einzelne natürliche grammatische Wandel hinsichtlich eines Parameters geschieht ohne 
Rücksicht auf die jeweils anderen Parameter” (ibid., p. 31). The reduction of phonological 
markedness of a form can lead to greater markedness regarding a morphological principle. If in 
a language, for example, unstressed vowels are reduced, leading to phonologically more 
unmarked forms, this can build markedness regarding the principle of morpho-semantic 
transparency. Since unstressed vowels are often inflectional affixes, the reduction of these 
makes the word morpho-semantically opaque. This example shows that language change 
proceeds with reference to one parameter only. The outcome can build markedness on another 
level and can thus conflict with another parameter. It is therefore impossible that there is an end 
point that language change is moving towards, although language change is directed. 
The question arises, however, why language change should follow these markedness 
principles. The logic behind this construct is that unmarked forms are preferred over the marked 
ones because they are more easily processed.  
Eine Erklärung des Phänomens der Markiertheit muß in der menschlichen Sprachkapazität 
selbst gesucht werden. Alle einschlägigen Fakten sprechen dafür, daß der Begriff der 
Markiertheit grammatische Komplexität reflektiert, die die Sprachkapazität belastet: Stärker 
markierte grammatische Erscheinungen belasten die Sprachkapazität mehr als ihre schwächer 
markierten Gegenstücke. Die schwächer markierten Erscheinungen sind für die Sprecher 
entsprechend leichter zu erwerben und zu handhaben und werden demzufolge von ihnen […] 
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präferiert. Der Grad der Markiertheit einer grammatischen Erscheinung ist also das relative 
Maß für die Belastung der menschlichen Sprachkapazität hinsichtlich eines bestimmten 
Parameters, das diese grammatische Erscheinung mit sich bringt. (Wurzel, 1994, p. 35) 
It is worth citing this passage at length because it is at the heart of the markedness construct. 
Marked forms are a burden on the human speech faculty and are therefore avoided. This means, 
then, that we are in fact dealing with an economy argument. The evidence for the markedness 
principles stem from several sources, including language typology, language acquisition, 
aphasia, error analysis and, unsurprisingly, language change. These principles are crucial for 
any attempt to explain language change with the theory of grammatisch initiierter Wandel. 
5.1.2 Sound Change and Phonological Principles 
We will now try to address the problem of sound change in the theory by Wurzel (1994). It was 
said above that we are confronted with a layer of markedness that assumes that marked forms 
are uneconomical because they are not as easily processed as unmarked forms. This applies 
also to phonology in that the human speech organs constrain the articulation and perception of 
language. 
Markiert sind diejenigen Laute, Lautkombinationen, Silben und Wörter, die verglichen mit 
anderen relativ schwer vom Sprecher zu artikulieren und / oder vom Hörer zu perzipieren sind. 
Phonologische Markiertheitsprinzipien sind also phonetisch begründet. Auf der Basis 
artikulatorischer und perzeptiver Komplexität […] besagen sie, was phonetisch gut bzw. leicht 
zu meistern ist. (Wurzel, 1994, p. 44) 
Wurzel hypothesizes that there are probably many phonological markedness principles 
(PMP) since there is a variety of possible cross-linguistic sound combinations, many of which 
have not been discovered yet (cf. Wurzel, 1994, 44f.). We may illustrate the nature of these 
PMPs by contrasting two of them which are interrelated.  
The first markedness principle (PMP1) Wurzel presents refers to the nasalization of vowels: 
“Ein Vokal ist hinsichtlich der Nasalität unmarkiert, wenn er nichtnasal ist und markiert, wenn 
er nasal ist” (ibid., p. 45). This principle is supported by several facts. Firstly, nasalized vowels 
are harder to articulate than non-nasalized vowels.23 Secondly, nasalized vowels are harder to 
distinguish in spoken speech. Moreover, all languages have non-nasalized vowels while not all 
languages have nasalized ones. A typological generalization is that nasalized vowels imply non-
nasalized ones but not vice versa (cf. ibid., 45f.). PMP1, then, would predict denasalization of 
vowels, for which there is indeed evidence in dialects.24  
 
23Nasalization requires the opening of the nasal cavity in addition, resulting in more articulatory energy. 
24 For instance, sche͂e͂ > schee/schie ‘schön’ in Frankish (and other dialects in Germany). 
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A second markedness principle (PMP2) shall be considered here. Here, it is held that “[e]in 
Vokal vor einem Nasalkonsonanten ist hinsichtlich der Nasalität unmarkiert, wenn er nasal ist 
und markiert, wenn er nichtnasal ist” (ibid., p. 47). Although this principle might seem to 
contradict PMP1, because in PMP2 nasalization is unmarked, this is a common assimilatory 
phenomenon. On the one hand, PMP2 refers to the realization of the vowel in a specific context, 
namely when a nasal consonant follows. PMP1, on the other hand, refers to context-free vowels. 
PMP2 is assumed because nasalized vowels are easier to articulate in front of a nasal consonant 
than non-nasalized vowels. There is evidence from Swabian where every vowel in front of a 
nasal is nasalized, for example /be͂:n/ ‘bin’, /so͂:n/ ‘Sohn’ (cf. ibid., p. 47).  
We can now turn to our sample sound change presented in chapter 3 and try to apply the 
notion of grammatisch initiierter Wandel outlined thus far. 
5.1.3 Breaking in the Markedness Framework 
The two principles PMP1 and 2 above have shown that there are context-free principles and 
contextualized ones for the same item (i.e. nasalized vowels). If we want to apply Wurzel’s 
theory to our sound change, the first step is to find out which kind of markedness is eliminated. 
Wenn in einem gegebenen Fall überprüft werden soll, ob ein dokumentierter Wandel aufgrund 
des Prinzips des natürlichen grammatischen Wandels erklärt werden kann, so muß ermittelt 
werden, worin der Markiertheitsabbau in diesem Fall besteht. (Wurzel, 1994, p. 32) 
There are several possible ways to go from here. One approach, which is adopted here, 
starts by surveying the relevant markedness principles. One specifically interesting principle is 
PMP5:  
Einheitlichkeit des Silbenkerns 
Eine Silbe ist hinsichtlich ihres Silbenkerns um so weniger markiert, je einheitlicher dieser ist 
(um so weniger verschiedene Segmente diesen bilden). (Wurzel, 1994, p. 52) 
Put differently, a syllable nucleus is unmarked the fewer vowels it contains. Marked are nuclei 
with a triphthong and unmarked those with a monophthong. Wurzel gives cross-linguistic 
evidence that all languages have monophthongs, while only some languages have diphthongs 
and few have triphthongs. Consequently, PMP5 would predict, for example, changes from 
diphthongs to monophthongs. However, the reverse, that is, changing monophthongs into 
diphthongs, should not happen. As we have seen in chapter 3, exactly this seemed to have 
happened in Old English breaking. Wurzel also acknowledges that there are cases of 
diphthongizations such as the New High German diphthongization which he views as 
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influenced by other, suprasegmental factors (cf. ibid., p. 53, footnote 15). In short, PMP5 
contradicts the outcome of breaking because diphthongization is not a “natural” process.25 
We are therefore forced to assume a different parameter for breaking. Similar to the 
principle PMP1 above, PMP5 is context-free because it generalizes the trend in syllable nuclei 
in whatever linguistic environment. It is reasonable to assume parallel to the contextual 
principle PMP2 as well a contextual principle for the nucleus principle PMP5. Monophthongs 
might be preferred in the nucleus generally, but in certain environments the opposite, i.e. 
diphthongs are preferred. We might state this phonological markedness principle for breaking 
(PMPB) as follows. 
PMPB: A vowel followed by a ‘back’ consonant is unmarked regarding the position of the 
tongue if it is a back vowel and marked if it is a front vowel. 
Similar to the principle PMP2, PMPB states markedness for vowels in the context of a following 
‘back’-articulated consonant, which the relevant consonants for breaking ([ɫ], [r] and [x]) are 
instances of. However, it has not been proven yet whether a dissimilated vowel-consonant 
combination of this type is in fact rare in the world’s languages, neither do we have evidence 
for corresponding speech errors.26 
If we accept for a moment the authenticity of PMPB, there is still no reason why the front 
vowel should become a diphthong. A front vowel that is marked in the specific environment 
(i.e. preceding a ‘back’ consonant) could as well be retracted to assimilate to the consonant. We 
face another problem of this theory here, namely that the markedness principles do not predict 
how markedness is reduced. It remains elusive, in our case, whether regressive or progressive 
assimilation occurs,27 and which measures are employed to reduce markedness. It would be 
possible, as was said, that the vowel in, for example, /æld/ simply retracts to /ald/. The strategy 
of breaking to insert a back vowel is not predictable from this perspective.  
To sum up, we have examined the theory of grammatisch initiierter Wandel which 
supposes that the initial cause of language change comes from the system itself. While relying 
largely on the structuralist linguistic theory, this approach adds a further layer to the system, 
 
25 A process is “natural“ if it is (cross-linguistically) very common, hence unmarked. Cf. the terms 
Natürlichkeitstheorie, natürlicher grammatischer Wandel etc.  
26 Further studies could give evidence for the PMPB from different branches of linguistics, such as language 
typology. It is beyond the scope of this study to supply exhaustive evidence for the principle, since the main focus 
is on the theories themselves. 
27 The principle PMPB in the form above would yield progressive assimilation. However, there is no reason 
to rule out regressive assimilation of the consonant. This version of the PMPB would state: A consonant that is 
preceded by a front vowel is unmarked if it is a “front” consonant (i.e. labial, alveolar, palatal) and marked if it is 
a “back” consonant (velar, uvular etc.). Consequently, another strategy could have been the assimilation of the 
consonant instead of the vowel.  
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thereby making use of the notion of markedness. This theory views language change as the 
reduction of markedness of a form. However, a form can be marked only in reference to a 
specific parameter. A change is therefore only a local improvement, i.e. reduction of 
markedness, which can result in increasing markedness regarding another markedness 
principle. Language change is thus directed, namely towards the reduction of markedness, but 
has no final end point.  
Assuming that unmarked forms are more economical for the speakers, the parameters are 
mainly grounded in cross-linguistic evidence. In trying to apply the theory to our example of 
breaking, we saw that parameters can be contradictory depending on their status as being 
contextual or context-free. It was necessary to formulate a contextual parameter in order to 
model breaking as reducing markedness. However, the parameters (and the theory) do not 
specify which strategies are adopted to overcome markedness.  
While it is characteristic of structuralist theories that they focus exclusively on the system 
as such, proponents of speaker-oriented approaches turn away from the system and consider 
the motivations of the language users, which will be our next focal point.  
5.2 The Pragmatic Approach to Language Change: Invisible-Hand Theory 
In the context of the pragmatic turn in the 1960s and 1970s, the previously ignored perspective 
of the language speaker was focused.28 The novel approach to interpret utterances as speech 
acts was an integral part of this pragmatic theory. Authors such as Austin and Searle proposed 
a speech act theory that emphasizes the action carried out by an utterance.  This theory has a 
long tradition – some scholars even view Wilhelm von Humboldt as the precursor of the modern 
pragmatic language theory29 (cf. e.g. Bülow, 2017, p. 47) – building mainly on the philosophical 
work of Ludwig Wittgenstein. In diachronic linguistics, the central assumption is that “change 
is […] driven by social factors and language users who are active participants in negotiation of 
linguistic patterning” (Traugott, 2012, p. 549).  
The perhaps most important contribution to pragmatic theory stems from Herbert Paul 
Grice who formulated maxims that language users follow. In the center of these maxims stands 
 
28 Other famous linguists, especially from sociolinguistic research, similarly emphasize the role of the speaker 
in explaining language change, adopting a pragmatic perspective, see cf. James Milroy (1997, 2003). 
29 It is not convincing to present Humboldt as a proponent of a speaker-oriented approach to language as 
Bülow (2017, p. 47) does. It is, however, true that Humboldt saw speech as the primary instance whose cumulation 
subsequently leads to a language instead of seeing the language as something given. Consequently, language is a 
dynamic and procedural entity that is mutually conditioned by its speakers (cf. Bülow, 2017, p. 48). On the other 
hand, saying that speech constitutes language is not the same as saying that speakers are using language to 
accomplish social goals, which is the premise of a pragmatic theory (of language change). Rather, it appears that 
Humboldt, as his primary argument, defined a language in terms of its expression of a nation’s Geist, cf. e.g. “über 
den Nationalcharakter der Sprachen” (Humboldt, 1996, p. 244).  
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the rational speaker that acts intentionally. Grice formulated in total eleven maxims that belong 
to one of the four categories of quantity, quality, relation and manner (cf. Bülow, 2017, p. 64f.). 
It has to be stressed that these maxims are not to be misunderstood as normative “rules”. The 
maxim of quantity “make your contributions as informative as required”, for example, is not an 
imperative for language users – although grammatically speaking, it is – but a description of 
“sensible” communicative behavior (cf. ibid., p. 65). These maxims are principles of 
“cooperative speaking”, which stresses the mutual interest of the interlocutors in pursuing these 
maxims. 
Pragmatic explanations are common in grammaticalization theory (e.g. Hopper & Traugott, 
2012; Traugott, 2002), stressing the desire of speakers to be articulatory economical and 
expressive. A specifically often cited and discussed theory in the pragmatic framework is the 
invisible-hand theory30 by Rudi Keller (1994) which we shall examine in what follows.  
5.2.1 Language Change as an Epiphenomenon  
The first important hypothesis of modelling language change as an invisible-hand process is 
that language change is an epiphenomenon (in Keller’s terms “a phenomenon of the third 
kind”). It is neither a natural phenomenon that happens without human intervention, nor an 
artificial object that is purely product of human design. Rather, phenomena of the third kind are  
collective phenomena. They come into existence through actions of many,  and this because 
the actions generating the phenomenon are characterized by certain similarities, which may be 
irrelevant as such, but which together can have certain consequences. (Keller, 1994, p. 61) 
The three fundamental characteristics of such a phenomenon are that they a) are procedural, b) 
consist of a micro- and a macrolevel and c) are both an artefact and a natural phenomenon (cf. 
ibid., p. 99). They are procedural because they arise as the consequence of many individual 
human actions. The respective motives and intentions of these actions are located on a 
microlevel, while the unintended result is located on a macrolevel.  
Keller compares language change with other phenomena of the third kind, such as a desire 
path. Humans tend to take the shortest way because one of the leading maxims is to be 
economical (cf. ibid., p. 100). Hence, the best strategy to accomplish this maxim in this case is 
to go the way that takes less time. This is the microlevel of the individual intentions. Since 
many individuals will choose the more economical alternative, the gras will be stepped down 
at this area, hence it is a procedural event. The ultimate result is a macrolevel structure, the 
 
30 Keller adopts this term from Scottish moral-philosophers of the 18th century, including Adam Smith and 
Adam Ferguson (cf. Bülow, 2017, p. 70). 
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desire path, that is initially not intended by the individuals, but is the inevitable result of the 
accumulation of the intentions on the microlevel.  
Keller presents the mechanism of an invisible-hand process as follows: 
An invisible-hand explanation explains its explanandum, a phenomenon of the third kind, as 
the causal consequence of individual intentional actions which are based on at least partially 
similar intentions. (Keller, 1994, p. 68) 
In the example of the desire path the intentions of the individuals were clear, i.e. take the 
shortest way. However, in the realm of language, there are a number of maxims that describe 
the communicative behavior. To act means for Keller to try to transform a “relatively less 
desirable state into a relatively more desirable one” (ibid., p. 101). This is reflected in his hyper-
maxim of communication: “Talk in such a way that you are socially successful, at the lowest 
possible cost“ (cf. ibid., p. 102). There are submaxims that are either static, i.e. those that do 
not cause language change, or dynamic maxims, hence lead to a change. Static maxims, on the 
one hand, maintain intelligibility: “Talk in such a way that the other understands you” (ibid., p. 
94). Dynamic maxims, on the other hand, can be focused on the (social) effect: “Talk in such a 
way that you are noticed” and “Talk in such a way that you are not recognizable as a member 
of the group”. The latter maxim is also an expression of identity by excluding the group that 
the speaker wishes not to identify with. In other words, this maxim is identification ex negativo. 
Moreover, dynamic maxims can also be based on the economy principle: “Talk in such a way 
that you do not expend superfluous energy. “ (ibid., p. 97f.)  
It is evident that these two kinds of maxims are often in conflict. If, for example, a speaker 
wants to be noticed, he can hardly save resources. Attracting attention is ultimately connected 
with innovative language use which will result in more cognitive or articulatory expenditure. 
Keller similarly notes:   
In a ‘diachronic conflict’ of a special kind, the maxim according to which we save articulatory 
energy clashes with the maxim according to which we talk in such a way as to be understood. 
(ibid., p. 103)  
5.2.2 Adopting Lüdtke’s Cycle of Language Change  
In trying to account for this conflict between striving to economize speech on the one hand and 
expressiveness on the other hand, Keller makes use of a diachronic model31 proposed by Helmut 
 
31 Similar models that describe diachronic developments were also proposed before Lüdtke. For instance, 
Otto Jespersen explained the shortening and extension of French negation in a cycle similar to Lüdtke’s cycle. 
However, Lüdtke can account for this cycle by adding his notion of redundancy.  
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Lüdtke (1980, cited in Keller, 1994, p. 106). This model holds that language change is a cycle 
that consists of the three following components. 
… > Lexikalische Anreicherung > Verschmelzung > lautliche Schrumpfung > … (after Keller, 
1994, p. 106) 
Speakers use redundancy in their expressions in order to make sure that they are understood. 
However, only a certain degree of redundancy is functional; if speech is more redundant than 
necessary the hearer will deem it boring. On the one hand, monitoring how much redundancy 
is functional in accomplishing maxims such as “be perspicuous”32 and at the same time making 
oneself noticed constitutes how much (phonetic, lexical) material is added. On the other hand, 
an economy maxim causes the speaker to erode phonetic material, since too much redundancy 
is counterproductive (cf. Keller, 1994, p. 105f.). This general principle of linguistic change is a 
directed process and therefore an irreversible “drift”. Keller sees the potential of this model to 
explain changes in his theory of the invisible hand.  
To my mind, Lüdtke has shown how three invisible-hand phenomena can follow each other 
cyclically so that the output of each preceding process (no matter where the starting-point is 
placed) provides the decisive ecological input conditions for each following process and sets 
it in motion. (Keller, 1994, p. 107) 
The necessary condition for the initiation of the next step in this cycle is that the speakers 
act according to the maxims that Keller also assumes. However, Keller’s hyper-maxim was 
defined as being both an economy and an expressiveness maxim (cf. above), assuming that 
different maxims can be relevant in one single utterance. It is therefore not logical why Lüdtke’s 
cycle should model a diachronic succession if the maxims are not understood as subsequent 
stages but as different factors that can combine at the level of speech production.  
At the same time, it is not surprising that Keller adopts this model for his theory. The 
invisible-hand process might be a convincing framework that makes language change plausible, 
but it is hard to imagine an actual change explained within this theory. This becomes apparent, 
and is among the standard criticism of this theory (cf. Croft, 2000, p. 61), that only two 
examples are discussed, both instances of semantic change. One example refers to the 
pejoration of the German word Frau and its replacement by Dame; the other deals with the 
former homonymy of englisch that was disambiguated by the emergence of engelhaft. In both 
instances, speakers are assumed to choose another word in the respective contexts, resulting in 
narrowing the use of Frau and englisch (cf. Keller, 1994, p. 90f.). On the one hand, it seems 
rather hard to explain sound change with this theory, since particular phonemes do not carry a 
 
32 One of Keller’s and Grice’s maxims (cf. Bülow, 2017, p. 65). 
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meaning themselves.33 Lüdtke’s model, on the other hand, has the advantage to be linguistically 
more applicable. We will now attempt to apply Keller’s framework to breaking again and 
thereby elucidate major problems of this theory. 
5.2.3 Breaking as an Invisible-Hand Process 
Since an invisible-hand process is a threefold process, we need to go step by step to explain a 
change with this theory. The first step is the presentation of the intentions, motives, goals etc. 
that cause the individuals to act. The subsequent step needs to show how the final structure 
emerges through the accumulation of the individual acts, and the third step presents this ultimate 
structure, i.e. the explanandum (cf. Keller, 2003, p. 67).  
The first step includes the formulation of the premises; the initial conditions that Keller (a 
bit unfortunate) calls ecological factors (ibid., p. 90). These can be of linguistic or non-linguistic 
nature. Keller, for example, assumes as an extra-linguistic ecological factor in the elimination 
of the englisch -homonymy the increasing importance of England in the context of the 
industrialization in the beginning of the 19th century (ibid., p. 90).  
Linguistic ecological factors, i.e. the initial conditions, on the other hand, refer to the 
individual competence of the speakers.34 It is in the area of linguistic factors that we must search 
for the initial conditions that led to breaking in the Old English period. 
Mitchell and Robinson (2012, p. 38) interestingly illustrate the process of breaking thus: 
You can see the result of this process in an exaggerated form if you imagine that you have 
fallen overboard from a ship and are calling out ‘Help’. If you call out loudly and long […], 
you will find that the vowel of the word ‘Help’ is ‘broken’ as you glide from the front position 
of e to the back position of lp. If you spell it as you are pronouncing it, you will write something 
like ‘Heulp’. (emphasis original) 
This vivid explanation might be of some help for us to state the initial conditions for breaking. 
If the vowel insertion is a phenomenon that occurs in loud and long articulation of the vowel-
consonant combinations, we have a convincing initial condition. We must, however, state that 
this is due to an assimilatory process, as was pointed out earlier. In order to abridge the distance 
between the back consonant and the front vowel, a glide develops between those two sounds. 
Hence, the initial conditions on a linguistic basis can be described as the phenomenon of 
assimilation.  
 
33 Phonemes distinguish particular words, hence the notion of minimal pairs. However, unlike lexemes, they 
do not refer to any kind of non-linguistic referent.  
34 Keller does not include the hearer in this constellation since “[t]he hearer’s real competence is not one of 
the factors influencing the speaker’s actions, as he or she has no access to it.” (Keller, 1994, p. 89) 
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The second step involves the formulation of the maxims that the speakers strive after. We 
can quite plausibly assume that breaking is a process that a) eases articulation and b) adds 
phonological material to the stem, i.e. producing a diphthong. Consequently, we can assume an 
economy maxim “Speak in such a way that you do not expend superfluous energy” (ibid., p. 
97), which accounts for the fact that speakers would insert a back vowel. However, similarly 
plausible would be the retraction of the respective front vowel or the ‘fronting’, i.e. 
palatalization of the ‘back’ consonant.  
Another kind of maxim that can be made plausible here rules out these two mentioned 
alternative solutions to the strive for speech economy. This is a maxim that in Lüdtke’s cycle 
corresponds to phonological/lexical enlargement. It is any dynamic maxim that would justify 
adding phonological material; hence a maxim such as “Talk in such a way that the other 
understands you”. This maxim was pointed out above and refers to what Lüdtke calls functional 
redundancy. We can equally see breaking as the development of a redundancy. Speakers might 
felt that the stem-vowel in feh35 is not as audible as in feoh ‘cattle’, hence could threaten the 
understanding of the message.  
In trying to elaborate those vowels, speakers would take an option that even accomplishes 
another maxim, an economy maxim. The new diphthongs are more expressive and are a better 
choice to convey the message. At the same time, they ease articulation because only vowels 
before a ‘back’ consonant are affected. We can quite plausibly assume the operation of Keller’s 
hyper-maxim “Talk in such a way that you are socially successful, at the lowest possible cost” 
(cf. above), which is both an economy and a social maxim.  
We have seen that we can only speculate on the initial conditions of breaking and the 
relevant maxims that could have brought about such a change. An invisible-hand explanation 
tries to reveal the intentions and goals of the individuals, i.e. the microlevel, whose 
accumulation leads to a structure at the macrolevel. Language change is such a structure. It is 
not intended but is the consequence of a great number of similar individual actions: a 
phenomenon of the third kind. 
While this theory makes language change plausible, it is rather hard to explain changes 
other than changes in the lexicon with it. It needs a linguistic element that carries some kind of 
meaning by itself in order to link it logically to the individual’s actions. Phonemes, however, 
do not carry meanings by themselves, hence sound changes need to be explained with either 
the ease of articulation or as the result of a redundancy monitoring process as Lüdtke described 
 




it, leading to the reduction or addition of linguistic material. These two motivations of sound 
change manifest themselves in two competing kinds of dynamic maxims. One states that speech 
should be as economical as possible, the other leads to more expressive utterances by adding 
phonetic material.  
Breaking can be interpreted as being both an instance of economizing speech and being 
expressive by adding phonetic material. The invisible-hand process as such, however, is not 
convincingly applicable to sound change, and does not contribute much to our understanding 
of breaking. An invisible-hand theory is better at explaining the spread of a novel form rather 
than the emergence of it. Hence, it describes the development of a direction where changes are 
leading towards, which means, according to Croft (2000, p. 60), that “the invisible hand process 
is an example of evolutionary drift”. Accordingly, our next focal point is a rather recent theory 
that tries to make use of Charles Darwin’s evolutionary theory.  
5.3 The Evolutionary Framework 
It has become apparent that the two theories presented until here are very different in their ways 
of explaining language change. While Wurzel’s theory excludes the speaker completely and 
seeks for impulses of change in the system itself, Keller’s notion of the invisible hand relies on 
the intentions of the individuals, the side-effect being language change. The attempt to unite 
those approaches is witnessed by Wurzel’s contribution (1997) with the telling title “Natürlicher 
Grammatischer Wandel, ‘unsichtbare Hand’ und Sprachökonomie – Wollen wir wirklich so 
Grundverschiedenes?”. Keller’s (1994, p. 110ff.) response is a harsh criticism of naturalness 
theory resulting in the rejection of the proposal because the differences are too vast.  
The 1990s were marked by the quest for an ontological framework that incorporates several 
language change theories and eventually saw the borrowing of the neo-Darwinian evolutionary 
theory. Cultural Darwinism, for example, assumes that cultural products can be described as an 
evolutionary process.36 However, seeing language change as an instance of evolution was only 
promoted hesitantly. Bülow (2017, p. 153) explains this fact by the dominance of generative 
linguistic theory, which assumes a certain amount of linguistic structures to be innate and hence 
not culturally transmitted.  
By regarding language as a cultural product, language change was modelled in analogy to 
the evolution of species. Several arguments justify this model, for example, the fact that both 
species and languages exist through time. Moreover, speakers, as well as organisms, build 
 
36 Neo-Darwinians also see the development of science as an evolutionary process. Certain paradigms in a 
discipline are better adapted to the field and survive, i.e. are selected, while less well adapted ones lose their 
influence (cf. Croft, 2000, p. 24). 
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populations with a certain degree of variation. Isolating parts of a population can similarly lead 
to divergence. Dialect continua can thus show the linguistic consequences of geographical 
separation of speakers. However, while it is true that the parent generation passes on the 
structures of the language to the child generation, language is not coded in the genes but is 
acquired. It follows that new variants in a language are not only produced by the succession of 
generations but also during a single generation (cf. McMahon, 1994, p. 336). 37  
Another difference lies in the fact that mutation in biology is defined as a random process, 
whereas language change can indeed be the consequence of intentionality. Bülow (2017), 
assuming Keller’s theory of the invisible hand, argues: “Weiterhin kann Sprachwandel 
insbesondere auf der Mikroebene […] intentional induziert sein. Dafür spricht, dass wir unser 
Sprachverhalten auch an dynamischen Maximen ausrichten” (p. 159). This is certainly a crucial 
difference between language change and evolution, which ultimately has to do with the 
consciousness of human actions in contrast to other organisms. 
Keller, recognizing the potential of the evolutionary model, added a chapter on “Language 
change as an evolutionary process” to his second edition of 1994. He argues that “there is only 
a small step from the theory of the invisible hand to the concept of evolution, historically as 
well as systematically.” (Keller, 1994, p. 139) The salient features of an evolutionary process 
are that a) it is not teleological, i.e. going in a pre-determined direction; b) it is a cumulative 
process brought about by a population, and, above all, c) it rests on the interaction of variation 
and selection (ibid., p. 139f.). It is uncontroversial that language change builds on synchronic 
variation, which is particularly emphasized by empirical studies on phonetics (e.g. Ohala, 
1989). Evolutionary theory, unlike any other theory, crucially highlights this component as the 
basis for language change; it is a conditio sine qua non. This allows to incorporate the findings 
of sociolinguistic theory since this paradigm investigates all sort of linguistic variation in a 
speech community.  
The second salient mechanism is selection, which is strictly separated from variation. 
Variation is ‘blind’ for its potential advantage it has on the organism. It is only by a subsequent 
mechanism that the best adapted instances are selected and given a reproductive advantage, 
 
37 This problem was also recognized by neo-Darwinians like Dawkins and Blackmore, and a Lamarckian 
theory was proposed instead. Lamarckism, in contrast to Darwinism, argues that the phenotype of an organism can 
have effects on the genotype. For instance, Lamarck thought that a giraffe stretched its neck in order to reach the 
higher leaves, making the neck grow longer. Similarly, linguistic forms are not coded in genes, and changes in 
utterances can therefore occur within one speaker’s lifetime.  
As organisms, idiolects are indeed more Lamarckian than Darwinian, since they frequently change their genetics 
makeups while they adapt to their different hosts, on whose life-style their vitality depends. (Mufwene, 2010, p. 
313, cited after Bülow, 2017, p. 158) 
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allowing the organism to spread its mutated gene in the gene pool of the population. Keller 
(1994, p. 143) proposes two kinds of selection mechanisms in language change, one is internal, 
that is, linguistic selection, the other social. Bülow (2017, p. 170) assumes only a social 
selection mechanism, but sees language as a “complex adaptive system”.38   
McMahon (1994) acknowledges the benefit of an evolutionary approach to rule out the 
notion of teleology as an explanation for directionality in language change. Although 
organisms, as well as languages, have undergone changes that seem to go in certain directions, 
this is only due to the operation of random mutation and selection.  
This axiom [of evolutionary methodology, R.M.] would help us solve our problem of 
perceived directionality, for which teleological explanations have previously been proposed. 
Perceived directionality is accepted in current evolutionary theory as resulting from random 
variation and natural selection, which combine to produce order with no necessary external 
direction. (McMahon, 1994, p. 337) 
The perhaps most elaborated evolutionary approach to explain language change was 
proposed by William Croft (2000), whose theoretical concepts that can help us to explain sound 
change are presented in the following.  
5.3.1 Variation and Selection – Croft’s Evolutionary Approach 
Croft presents a theory of utterance selection which is deeply connected to his understanding 
of language. Any kind of monocausal theory is suspicious, hence it is necessary to propose a 
theory that allows for different factors in explaining language change. Croft begins by 
criticizing the structuralist notion of language as an abstract system, thereby refusing 
structuralist theory altogether: 
The position taken in this book is that the study of language is about empirically real entities, 
not idealized abstract systems. The real entities of language are utterances and speaker’s 
grammars. Language change occurs via replication of these entities, not through inherent 
change of an abstract system. (Croft, 2000, p. 4) 
The starting point is again neo-Darwinian theory, which was briefly mentioned above. Croft 
mainly refers to David Hull (1988) who  models the development of scientific paradigms and 
theories as an evolutionary process. Hull (1988) identifies replicators, i.e. the genes, and 
interactors, i.e. the organism that interacts with its environment. A replicator is “an entity that 
passes on its structure largely intact in successive replications” (ibid., p. 408), whereas the 
interactor “causes replication to be differential” (ibid., p. 409). The product of replication can 
 
38 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to outline the arguments for language as a complex adaptive system 
(“chaos theory”) in the evolutionary framework. For an exhaustive discussion see Bülow (2017), Lass (1997). 
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be either an identical copy, hence normal replication, or a different structure, i.e. altered 
replication (cf. Croft, 2000, p. 23). The latter type, altered replication, is the source for variation 
in a population. 
It is assumed that the interactor and the mechanism of selection give rise to what is called 
differential replication. Since selection causes some interactors to have an advantage over 
others, these variants will exert a greater influence in the population.  
The paradigm example of differential replication is the increase in frequencies of certain genes 
due to the favored survival and reproduction of the individual organisms possessing those 
genes in their ecological environment. (Croft, 2000, p. 23).  
Language change relies to a great extent on the working of the language itself. In other 
words, it is impossible to understand language change if we do not understand how speakers 
use their language. Croft defines language as “the population of utterances in a speech 
community” (ibid., p. 26). An utterance is defined as 
a particular, actual occurrence of the product of human behavior in communicative interaction 
(i.e. a string of sounds), as it is pronounced, grammatically structured, and semantically and 
pragmatically interpreted in its context. (Croft, 2000, p. 26) 
This has several consequences. Firstly, a language is nothing more than the sum of all its 
generated utterances. Secondly, it follows that utterances that were never in fact physically 
produced are not part of the language. This obviously conflicts with the generativist assumption 
of a speaker’s grammar in terms of its ability to produce an infinite number of sentences. Any 
token39 that has never been pronounced before but could be uttered is in Croft’s definition not 
part of the language. Similarly, a token that has never been produced but could be understood 
by the hearer is theoretically not “language”. Once it is produced for the first time, it becomes 
language and in this moment is intelligible. Croft argues that this aspect is important for the 
theory of selection since selection only operates on actual individuals in biology. A population, 
and therefore a language in this model, “is a spatiotemporally bounded set of actual individuals, 
not a set of ‘possible’ individuals – whatever that would mean” (ibid., p. 26). In biology this 
might be hard to imagine, but generativist theory has emphasized that sentences like “Colorless 
green ideas sleep furiously” (Chomsky, 1957/2002, p. 142)40 that were never heard before can 
be understood.  
 
39 I choose the term “token“ here because, according to Croft’s definition of an utterance, it must have been 
pronounced before. Token here means any kind of human speech production. 
40 This famous sentence stems from Noam Chomsky’s book Syntactic Structures (1957/2002). 
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In a similar vein, Croft’s notion of the speaker’s grammar is not a generative one but simply 
defines it as the structure that is used in producing utterances.  
A grammar is the cognitive structure in a speaker’s mind that contains her knowledge about 
her language, and is the structure that is used in producing and comprehending utterances […]. 
The grammar of each speaker is acquired on the basis of the subpopulation that she is exposed 
to. 41 (Croft, 2000, p. 26) 
Consequently, since every individual has a different linguistic input in the acquisition process, 
every speaker has a slightly different grammar. The speaker and its grammar subsequently 
correspond to the interactor in Hull’s terms, which interacts communicatively with the speech 
community, i.e. the environment. The latter also includes “the social context of the speech 
event, and the goals of the speech event itself” (ibid., p. 27).  
The next necessary element of evolutionary biology is that of the genes. Croft proposes the 
“lingueme” as the replicator in language that corresponds to the gene. Similar to the DNA that 
consists of genes, an utterance consists of linguemes that have a linguistic structure. Linguemes 
can be “anything from a phoneme to a morpheme to a word to a syntactic construction, and also 
their conventional semantic/discourse-functional values” (ibid., p. 28). Croft goes on to equate 
alleles in biology, i.e. alternative forms of a gene, with variants of a lingueme. This includes 
synonymy, allophony and any other alternative form to express the same idea (cf. ibid., p. 28). 
The set of all linguemes form the lingueme pool in analogy to the gene pool. Hence every 
utterance consists of linguemes that are replicated in speech production.  
It is crucial to understand how the speaker produces an utterance in this conception, leading 
to the “utterance selection model”, which is the theoretical core of Croft’s approach.  
5.3.2 The Utterance Selection Model  
Replicating linguemes in certain social contexts is governed by convention in the speech 
community. Accordingly, choosing the appropriate lingueme for an utterance is determined by 
the linguistic convention. It follows that the parameter of convention in utterance selection is 
the salient factor that separates normal replication from altered replication.  
Normal replication is simply conformity to linguistic convention. Altered replication is the 
result of not conforming to linguistic convention. However, a wide range of mechanisms may 
lead to a speaker not conforming to linguistic convention in an utterance. (Croft, 2000, p. 31) 
These mechanisms as Croft calls them are certainly crucial for motivating language change and 
rely on many theories proposed in the literature. Before we look at the specific mechanisms that 
 
41 Croft uses the female pronoun to refer to the speaker and the male pronoun for the hearer.  
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can motivate sound change in this model, we can now put all the elements together and describe 
the selection process.  
Croft argues that selection in language change is a social phenomenon, not a functional. 
The variants that developed through altered replication are alternative forms. However, they do 
not remain mere doublets without any difference. It seems to be the nature of the human 
language faculty, from the speaker’s perspective, to use a different form with a different 
function, and from the hearer’s perspective, to assume that a different form fulfills a different 
function. We are aware of the fact that two variants tend to acquire a distinctive feature since 
there is almost no case of exact synonymy.42 With the insights of sociolinguistic theory, Croft 
argues that social parameters essentially govern the selection of one variant over the other. 
The variants in a linguistic variable have social values associated with them. Speakers select 
variants to use […] in particular utterances on the basis of their social values: overt or covert 
prestige, the social relation of the speakers to the interlocutor, etc. (Croft, 2000, p. 32) 
The lingueme that the speaker chooses over another lingueme has a specific social value. 
Deciding for a lingueme results in either conforming or not conforming to convention, which 
is ultimately conditioned by the communicative situation and the intentions of the speaker. An 
utterance necessarily replicates one or more linguemes; the selected linguemes display whether 
normal or altered replication has occurred. We might summarize the utterance selection model 
thus: 
 
SPEAKER                                                                                                       UTTERANCE 
Grammar 
 
                                                                LINGUEME POOL                        LINGUEME(S) 
 
Intentions, goals etc. 
Communicative situation 
 
The utterance selection model asserts that the primary locus of language change is utterance  
Firstly, the utterance selection model holds that utterance selection is the primary – though 
not the only – locus of language change (Croft, 2000, p. 30). Moreover, it puts linguistic 
convention in the center because for every communicative situation there is a conventional 
 
42 Synonymy in its purest form is almost unattainable in language. One form might acquire a slightly distinct 











lingueme and there are unconventional ones. The conventionality of a structure is crucial 
because it separates normal replication from altered replication, which leads to new variation. 
The cumulation of this social selection process by many speakers leads to the differential 
replication of linguemes, causing some of them to eventually die out and others to proliferate. 
Croft assumes specific linguistic maxims to be responsible for the selection of one form over 
another. Above all, those maxims that define talking as an act of identity are relevant, including 
maxims such as “Talk like the others talk”, whereby the “others” are the social group that the 
speaker wishes to identify with (cf. ibid., p. 73). 
Secondly, the utterance selection model and the whole evolutionary approach understands 
language change as two separated processes: replication that leads to variation in some cases 
and selection which is understood as differential replication. These two processes correspond 
to innovation, i.e. the genesis of novel forms, and propagation of changes. A specific variant 
that was innovated in a speech community is not an instance of language change until more 
speakers adopt this form. Croft (2000, p. 64) presents several mechanisms for normal 
replication, thus leading to stasis, and for innovative language use respectively. We now turn 
to the relevant mechanisms for innovation in phonology since we are interested in the ways this 
theory can explain sound changes.  
5.3.3 The Rise of Phonological Innovations  
Once we define innovation as not conforming to linguistic convention, the question arises why 
speakers should break with conventions. Croft (2000) is right in saying that “[s]peakers have 
many goals when they use language, but changing the linguistic system is not one of them” (p. 
70). Teleological mechanisms in the sense of intentionally changing the language are therefore 
futile, especially in Croft’s conception of language. Why should speakers strive to make the 
phonological system symmetrical – e.g. providing both a voiced and unvoiced phoneme – when 
the language does not exist as an abstract system? If language is the set of actually produced 
utterances, there is no symmetry of phonemes, nor do speakers have access to those 
abstractions.  
Rather, far more compatible with Croft’s utterance selection model is the notion of 
individual intentional behavior that has innovative language use as its consequence. This 
concept was already mentioned in Keller’s theory of the invisible hand and can be referred to 
as functional explanations.43 Accordingly, we can incorporate dynamic maxims that account 
for innovative language use. Those refer either to expressiveness (e.g. “Talk in such a way that 
 
43 Functional are explanations of the type “X became Y to fulfil function Z”/”The new Y can now do Z”. 
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you are noticed”, and variations thereof) or invoke the economy principle (“Talk in such a way 
that you do not expend superfluous energy” (Keller, 1994, p. 97)). One fundamental problem 
with the economy principle in Croft’s framework is that it is not based on social interaction. 
Croft, similar to Keller, assumes that utterance selection is a social phenomenon that is 
conditioned by interaction. This problem can be fixed by incorporating the economy argument 
into the intentions of the speaker: “Economy may serve the interlocutor’s goal of using as little 
time as possible in achieving their other interactional goals” (Croft, 2000, p. 75).44  
The third functional explanation for innovation is the strive to avoid misunderstanding.45   
Speaking in order not to be misunderstood cannot be reduced to conformity with linguistic 
convention. One can speak cryptically or confusingly and still be conforming to linguistic 
convention. Conversely, one might use a paraphrase or circumlocution that is not the 
conventional expression for an idea, in order not to be misunderstood. (Croft, 2000, p. 75) 
Unsurprisingly, Croft’s argumentation witnesses that functional explanations always rely on 
the specific pragmatic context. Linguistic convention and the speaker’s intentions can conflict, 
which leads to innovative language use, e.g., using a more expressive, hence unconventional 
form in order to be understood. Conversely, there are contexts in which the opposite of the 
economy principle is desired, for example, keeping a conversation going instead of ‘awkward 
silence’. This strategy to make speech more redundant can be a convention in a speech 
community but runs counter to the economy maxim.  
Beside those functional explanations, we must also consider non-intentional explanations. 
Croft calls them mechanical processes, whereby the speakers do not even strive to accomplish 
any goal. They rely only on the physiology of speech and audition. Examples of mechanical 
innovations are speech errors, although they are of little importance in sound change according 
to Croft (2000, p. 76).46 Among the non-intentional mechanisms that Croft deems more 
important for language change are target-missing mechanisms.  
 
44 A specifically interesting aspect concerns the interaction of the principles that Croft suggests: Economy is 
presented as a meta-principle that becomes relevant once the other principles are satisfied. The question remains, 
however, whether this interpretation of economy is conciliable with the immense power that economic tendencies 
seem to have in processes of linguistic change. Particularly, it may be argued that certain levels of grammar are 
prone to be economized (phonology), while others do not (morphology). Such a discussion is worth addressing in 
future investigations.  
45 This maxim is similar to Humboldt’s maxim that maintains intelligibility (cf. e.g., Croft, 2000, p. 75), but 
is not identical with it.  
46 Croft argues that the mechanism of speech errors is “empirically untenable, because the sorts of novel forms 
created by speech errors are not the sort of language changes that are empirically attested” (p. 76). It has to be 
noted, however, that speech errors contribute considerably to the variation of speech, which was already 
emphasized by Hermann Paul (1995). 
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Articulatory mechanisms for altered replication of phonemes can be described as target-
missing mechanisms: the speaker aims to produce a particular sound, but overshoots or 
undershoots the target, for essentially physiological reasons. (Croft, 2000, p. 76) 
From the hearer perspective, reanalysis plays a major role. With Ohala (1989) phonetic 
reanalysis consists of two types, hypo-correction and hyper-correction. We will now consider 
Old English breaking again and try to see it as an instance of reanalysis in the evolutionary 
framework.  
5.3.4 Breaking as an Evolutionary Process  
Any attempt to explain a change in the evolutionary framework needs to explain a) how the 
variation came about, and b) which selective forces supported this specific form. In Croft’s 
model the two processes correspond to innovation and propagation, which he understands as 
two strictly separated processes leading to a change. We will begin first by having a closer look 
at the possible origins of the diphthongs that breaking produced. The subsequent step of 
selection can only be discussed briefly and less practically for reasons to be outlined below.  
Variation is pervasive in language and is primarily caused by the physiology of speech. 
Ohala (2012, p. 27) argues that “variation is potentially infinite and is mechanically caused”. 
Pronunciation is limited by the vocal tract and therefore is a unique event. No phonetic 
realization in speech is identical with another:  
Whatever the intention of the speaker may be, the speech that emerges from the vocal tract is 
the product of that intention plus the effect of physical constraints. Though the speaker’s 
intention may be the same from one utterance to another, the speech signal will vary if the 
effect of the physical constraints vary – as they will with rate and loudness of speech, etc. 
(Ohala, 1989, p. 176) 
Here, “Intentions” of the speakers is used very differently from the pragmatic-functionalist 
understanding of the term. For Ohala, intention in speech production refers to the mechanism 
of having a mental representation, i.e. a phoneme, which the speaker wishes to articulate. The 
fact that phonetic realization is highly variable was proven in experimental paradigms by Ohala 
(e.g. 1989). One of the important results of those experiments is that phonetic variation is 
contextually caused (Ohala, 2012, p. 27).  
It is assumed that the listener is capable of identifying the variant as being distorted and 
consequently reconstructs the correct representation, i.e. phoneme. The hearer, “by identifying 
the source of the vowel distortion, […] is able to recover the identity of the intended syllable” 
(Ohala, 2012, p. 27). This is the process of normal replication of phonemes that accounts for 
stasis. Usually the discourse context and the communicative situation hint towards the 
corrective rule to be applied by the listener, as well as his experience with speech. The listener 
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knows, for example, “that a slightly affricated release to a stop before a high front vowel or 
glide is to be expected and that it is not part of the speaker’s intention” (Ohala, 1989, p. 185). 
This mechanism, which Ohala calls correction, is salient for understanding and keeps 
communication intact.  
One source of altered replication of phonemes, leading to innovation, is hypo-correction. 
Here, the speaker’s phonetic realization is distorted but the listener fails to correct it. 
Consequently, the listener has a different representation of the phoneme than the speaker 
intended (Ohala, 2012, p. 28). Hyper-correction, on the other hand, happens when the speaker’s 
realization is not distorted, but the listener applies a corrective rule which leads him to a 
different representation. Ohala (2012, p. 28) argues that hypo-correction can account for 
assimilations, while hyper-correction accounts for dissimilations.  
We may assume that breaking is an instance of hypo-correction where the listener failed to 
correct the phoneme he heard. To make this plausible, we have to assume that speakers realized 
the vowels æ, e and i before a ‘back’ consonant slightly different for physiological reasons. It 
was pointed out earlier that the insertion of a glide between the front vowel and the consonant 
is a ‘natural’ process for articulatory reasons. The subsequent inability of (some) speakers to 
factor out the glide as being due to physiology led to a different representation of those vowels. 
Listeners would increasingly recognize æ, e, i as being intended as diphthongs. Their altered 
mental representation then causes them to produce the diphthong themselves. Figure 3 may 
illustrate this process with the case of æ that breaks into ea / [æu].  
Speaker                                                           Listener 
  /æ/                                                                 /æu/                             
 
 [æu]                        Heard as                         [æu]                     [æu]           
 
 
In sum, this view holds that altered replication occurred by hypo-correction. The respective 
vowels were frequently distorted phonetically for physiological reasons. In some cases, the 
inserted vowel was corrected and thus did not affect the mental representations, while in other 
cases speakers were not able to apply the corrective rule. The result was an altered mental 
representation, namely a diphthong instead of the from the speaker intended monophthong. This 
altered lingueme was then replicated again by those speakers. It follows that variation in the 
Mental representation  
Phonetic realization 
Figure 3: Hypo-correction in the case of breaking, after Ohala (2012, p. 28). 
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speaker population came about that affected the realization of these vowels in the specific 
environments for breaking.  
Once we have a plausible hypothesis about how the variant developed, the next step is the 
identification of the selective forces that governed the propagation of the new lingueme. Croft 
(2000, p. 166) argues that selection is only socially conditioned: “the mechanisms for 
propagation of innovations in language change are social, that is, they involve the relationship 
between the speaker – the interactor – and the society to which she belongs”. But if we 
understand selection as the differential replication of some linguemes at the expense of others, 
we need to apply the utterance selection model in order to explain why speakers choose a 
conventional or non-conventional lingueme. Croft’s utterance selection model discussed above 
does however hold that not only social but also functional factors (the speaker’s goals, the 
communicative situation etc.) influence the speaker’s linguistic choice.  
Croft’s exclusively social definition of the selection process in terms of prestige and group 
identification does not logically combine with his utterance selection model. Hence it is 
unsurprising that one fundamental criticism in the literature is his one-sided notion of selection 
that neglects functional factors (cf. e.g. Rosenbach, 2008; Seiler, 2006). We will return to this 
issue in the following discussion. The main emphasis of the discussion will be laid on certain 
aspects that have shown to be controversial in each of the theories presented here, and in the 
literature. By doing so, we will arrive at some comparative remarks on the explanations that 
these theories offer. We will close by problematizing the relevance of an evolutionary approach 
and the question of a pertinent linguistic theory.  
6. Critical Discussion  
The first theory we examined was a structuralist theory by Wolfgang Ulrich Wurzel. Firstly, in 
order to explain sound changes with this theory it is necessary to find out which kind of 
markedness this particular change reduced. This was the first problem that we encountered, 
because a change can be caused by a variety of principles, not only phonological principles. 
Semantic or morphological principles can as well have a phonological change as its 
consequence.  
Secondly, the reconstruction of the corresponding markedness principle is questionable. 
The principle proposed by Wurzel himself which holds that diphthongs are marked in syllable 
nuclei even rules out changes of diphthongizations, such as breaking. If we rather assume a 
contextual principle that defines a linguistic environment where diphthongs might be preferred, 
we can hardly prove the existence of such a principle. Are there infinite markedness principles? 
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It appears to be the case that for every change we can come up with a fitting principle. Although 
Wurzel claims that these principles are founded in language typology and other research fields, 
the fact that known changes are one source of his principles makes their authenticity dubious. 
Taking language changes as a source for the markedness principles, which are then taken to 
explain language change, represents a major problem of circularity.  
Furthermore, what is striking is the logic of equating commonness of structures with 
simplicity. Only because monophthongs are more common than diphthongs in nuclei, we 
cannot infer that monophthongs are more easily processed. The fundamental problem with 
speech economy arguments in general is their “failure […] to apply in a particular instance” 
(Lass, 1980, p. 19). They can neither predict changes nor counter-predict the opposite. If a 
marked form is not changed in a language, proponents of this theory would argue, it must be 
simply due to another markedness principle that blocks it. Such conflicting principles seem 
plausible in some cases, such as morphosemantic transparency versus erosion of unstressed 
syllables. In general, however, incorporating blocking-mechanisms is a strategy to avoid 
explaining specific instances, since the markedness theory describes at best a general trend of 
language change. From this perspective, it can be confirmed that indeed “’naturalness’ does not 
explain anything” (Lass, 1980, p. 15). 
In contrast to Wurzel’s highly formalized theory, Keller’s notion of the invisible hand in 
language change offers a functional explanation of language change. Keller does not locate the 
cause of language change in the system as Wurzel does but assumes that speakers strive for 
similar individual goals. The cumulation of these actions brings about language change. The 
question remains which maxims that reflect the speaker’s goals are relevant for a specific 
change. Keller argues that the ecological conditions lead the speakers to follow a specific 
maxim. But this factor is not sufficiently defined in the theory; what makes an ecological 
condition a necessary feature for a maxim? The (few) examples that Keller offers are only 
semantic changes. In the case of the former homonymy of englisch, the rise of industrialization 
caused the two meanings of the word to become virulent because it threatened the 
communicative success. Hence the maxim “speak in such a way that you are understood” 
triggered a different derivational suffix for one of the meanings. It seems, however, that these 
“stories” are rather arbitrary in nature. Keller does not pay much attention to them, although 
they are an integral part of his theory. In explaining sound change we face major problems 
because which “story”, i.e. ecological condition, can we reconstruct for a phoneme? Even if we 
had all details of the society where the change took place, how can we identify the relevant 
condition that triggered the specific maxim at work?  
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The problems outlined thus far ultimately depend on the fact that the invisible hand is a 
theory of the propagation of changes, not innovation. Likewise, Croft (2000, p. 62) sees the 
invisible hand as a “relatively minor propagation mechanism”. In terms of innovative language 
use, Keller’s theory relies on linguistic maxims only. Those are more general in nature, and 
therefore cannot be taken to explain specific instances of changes. Rather, it seems that Keller’s 
approach refers to the ‘big picture’ in language change that elucidates the logic behind 
propagation. Whether changes really propagate according to the invisible hand is still another 
question. It might account for few semantic changes of pejoration.  
We can discern in those two theories discussed until here that they both employ strategies 
to avoid teleology. In Wurzel’s account, a plain markedness theory would be directed towards 
unmarked forms, which is the final end point. Since it is uncontroversial that change cannot 
improve or deteriorate language, there must be elements that conflict with one another. A form 
is not generally marked for Wurzel but is marked to a certain degree regarding one specific 
parameter. The same form can be unmarked regarding a different parameter. Moreover, 
markedness is gradable and therefore is not always entirely eliminated; only the most marked 
forms are changed.  
In a similar vein, Keller’s maxims also conflict with one another. Economy maxims cannot 
be the only ones because this would mean that language becomes always more economical. 
Expressiveness maxims are opposed to economy and try to explain why language does not 
always become more economical and shorter. It is due to the communicative situation which of 
the two dynamic maxims is dominant in an innovative utterance. Keller’s hyper-maxim 
combines the economy principle with expressiveness. This rules out the possibility that 
language becomes either more economical or expressive. One problem with this is that in most 
cases these two dynamic maxims would theoretically block each other. Unlike Wurzel’s 
conflicting markedness principles, it is not logical why one maxim should dominate if both are 
relevant for an utterance. Maxims that neutralize each other in an utterance might be taken to 
account for the pervasiveness of stasis, i.e. no changes in languages.  
Croft (2000) offers a more sophisticated theory of innovation in language change. On the 
one hand, there are intentional mechanisms that basically acknowledge the existence of 
linguistic maxims. On the other hand, there are non-intentional mechanisms that produce 
variation. Croft (2000, p. 117ff.) argues that these are to be explained functionally in terms of 
form-function reanalysis. By viewing the lingueme as the replicator in his model, innovation is 
defined as altered replication. Form-function reanalysis is motivated by the uniqueness of the 
speech event. No utterance is like any other, which gives rise to infinite variation. On the level 
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of phonology, variation is in part due to the physiology of speech production and the errors in 
the listener’s correction-processes. But the dividing line between normal replication and what 
is considered altered replication is not immediately clear in language. Rosenbach (2008, p. 37) 
similarly asks: “[T]o what extent is a replicated variant still ‘the same’ as its source, and how 
big a step does it take for variants to be ‘different’?”. As we have seen in the preceding chapter, 
altered replication in our example was caused by the inability of the listener to correct the 
phonetic realization of the speaker. This led to an altered mental representation of the phoneme.  
Above all, the notion of contingency in evolutionary biology promises to give important 
impulses for the rise of innovations. Blevins (2004, p. 314) notes that innovation can indeed be 
random but at the same time be phonetically motivated. Similar to biological replication where 
“certain DNA replicators are just more likely to occur than others” (Rosenbach, 2008, p. 39), 
linguistic variation is also in a sense random. It is important to define what we mean by random. 
Crucially, certain forms are “random in the sense that their probability is causally unconnected 
to the effect they have on subsequent fitness” (ibid., p. 40). This is compatible with Croft’s 
postulate that innovation and propagation are strictly separated processes. New innovations are 
‘blind’ for their possible advantages of being selected. Selection has to be causally independent 
of the mechanisms that produces variation. This seems to be the logic behind assuming 
innovation to be functional and propagation to be social, which has been subject to criticism 
(e.g. Seiler, 2006). 
For Croft, selection happens at the level of the interactor and is therefore exclusively 
socially determined. A speaker chooses one form over the other because he or she wants to 
identify with a social group. This idea is largely motivated by the findings of sociolinguists 
such as Labov (1994). At the same time, the locus of selection is utterance selection, which 
assumes a multifactorial situation. According to the utterance selection model, not only social 
factors play a role, but also the communicative situation, the goals of the speaker etc. In 
addition, Seiler (2006, p. 181) notes that the solely social definition of selection is inconsistent 
given Croft’s holistic notion of the interactor.  
The definition of the interactor […] is remarkably multi-dimensional. If a speaker has the 
choice between options, it is not surprising that at the moment of the concrete selection of an 
option she is exposed to a multiplicity of influences and preferences, only a subset of which 
are social factors. (Seiler, 2006, p. 181) 
The selection mechanism is similar to an invisible-hand process. Speakers select a variant 
in order to pursue their individual goals; the cumulation of the individual actions leads to an 
unintended result, a language change.  
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A particular variant may be selected increasingly often such that other competing variants 
possibly die out. Change therefore is an unintended by-product of many individual choices 
among available variants (speakers don’t select variants ‘in order to’ change their language, 
but because they want to communicate successfully, here and now). (Seiler, 2006, p. 164) 
Seeing language change as an invisible-hand process has the advantage of avoiding the question 
of selection, because the change spreads through similar goals of the individuals. It is very 
unlikely, however, that selection is only functionally conditioned. Social factors must be part 
of a theory of selection; whether functional factors do really play a role needs to be investigated.  
Above all, the evolutionary approach by Croft is a convincing model because it is able to 
combine the theories proposed in the literature. The subsequent question of whether the 
evolutionary approach actually changes the way we investigate language change was addressed 
in Croft (2006). Firstly, the evolutionary model argues for a two-step process that has several 
empirical implications, for example, the fact that experimental paradigms can be taken to 
elucidate the mechanisms for innovation (cf. Ohala, 1989; 2012). Rosenbach (2008, p. 56) 
similarly argues for the implementation of psycholinguistic concepts such as priming in an 
evolutionary framework.  
Secondly, Croft’s model can eliminate the notion of teleology in questions of language 
change. By stressing contingency, it integrates functional and social explanations in an abstract 
framework. This then also rules out the possibility of predicting language change, which no 
theory to my knowledge has ever achieved.  
Furthermore, it is impossible to predict the occurrence of change in linguistics or biology, 
since change results from random, chance mutations. In this matter, however, biology is far 
ahead of linguistics since biologists have been interested in variation for much longer. 
(McMahon, 1994, p. 336f.) 
The biological metaphor can then also be taken to give interesting impulses for linguistics, as 
happens with the notion of exaption (cf. Lass, 1997; van de Velde & Norde, 2016). 
Thirdly, the evolutionary approach can elucidate the quest for a linguistic theory that 
incorporates the contrasting views of the different theories. Hence “[t]he study of language 
change can easily be transmuted into the study of language itself, because language is 
fundamentally a variable, dynamic phenomenon.” (Croft, 2000, p. 229) It follows that change 
and transformation must be part of the definition of a language. For instance, Croft’s definition 
of language as the set of actual utterances is based on a speaker-oriented approach. It basically 
assumes a functional-pragmatic linguistic theory similar to Keller’s approach. By viewing 
language as a communicative instrument, language is “made and remade, created and recreated, 
formed and re-formed, by its users, adapting it to the ever changing circumstances of language 
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use” (Thomsen, 2006, p. 308). Language in this understanding is processual (energeia) rather 
than a static product (ergon). This dynamic understanding then also sees language as a unique 
historical entity, a token. Croft (2000, p. 2) argues that  
[i]n the study of linguistics, the real, existing entities are utterances as they are produced in 
context, and speakers and their knowledge about their language as it is actually found in their 
minds. 
Different linguistic theories, such as structuralist theory in the case of Wurzel, have a 
different understanding of what a language is. Structuralism abstracts away from the speaker to 
describe the structure of the system. This view has been argued to be part of the discourse of 
historical linguistics. 
Much more generally, however, the idea of endogenous or internally triggered change is so 
deeply embedded in our subject that it feeds into what can be called the discourse of historical 
linguistics. In this discourse, individual languages are typically presented as changing within 
themselves rather than being changed through the agency of speaker/listeners. (James Milroy, 
2003, p. 357, emphasis original) 
It is precisely this discourse that Wurzel’s theory is part of. The system itself is claimed to 
have the potential to cause changes. Abstractions, however, are sometimes necessary and 
helpful as long as we keep in mind that they are in fact only abstractions and are not mistaken 
for the complex reality of language. Roger Lass explains his structuralist approach thus: 
The view of language in time that I have been advocating in this chapter […] is 'structuralist' 
in the specific sense that its basis is neither 'cognitive' nor 'social'; communication and 
meaning, however central they are to the use of language, are not at the centre of change, or at 
least of major structural change. It puts a premium on system-internal transformation, and 
devalues, or at least marginalizes, the human actor. In this way it stands in sharp opposition to 
the notions of all-pervasive semiosis, 'striving for communicative efficiency', 'teleological 
dynamism', etc. that one gets in the models of change proposed by writers like  Anttila or 
Shapiro […]. For these semiotically inclined scholars, the evolution of language is a constant 
'striving for meaning', as for the sociolinguistically centred […] it is a matter of 'social 
negotiation'. I am not very sympathetic to such views, which are a bit like vulgar adaptionism 
in biology (all monocausal theories are suspicious). As eclipsing as this sounds, it is not an 
attempt to say that the other approaches are 'wrong'; rather that they are complementary, 
because different ways of looking at language involve looking at different things. (Lass, 1997, 
p. 324) 
Crucially, it shall be emphasized that different theories are not wrong or right, as Lass notices, 
but simply adopt a different perspective. Those perspectives are all part of the truth, and together 
can give a comprehensive account of language and therefore also of language change.  
So setzt sich das heutige Bild des sprachlichen Wandels kaleidoskopartig aus den Resultaten 
verschiedener Schulen zusammen, die jedoch durch den Bezug zu nicht-linguistischen 
Disziplinen einerseits und das Wissen aus Indogermanistik und synchroner 
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Sprachwissenschaft andrerseits über breite Ausgangsdaten, grundlegende methodische 
Verfahren und vielfältige theoretische Annahmen verfügen. (Zeige, 2011, p. XIII)  
Similarly, this study has shown that the theoretical approaches discussed here differ in major 
questions of what defines a language. At the same time, however, each theory focusses on a 
different aspect of the problem, thereby contributing to the understanding of language change 
as a whole. It is the task of future work to stress the aspects that these approaches have in 
common, rather than complaining about their irreconcilability. This way we might be able to 
construct a refined ontological frame which combines the proposed perspectives logically. 
Models of non-linguistic descent are particularly promising, as Zeige (2011)47 notes. In this 
sense, evolutionary theory was shown to provide a fruitful metaphor for historical linguistics.  
7. Conclusion  
In conclusion, this study compared three language change theories with very different 
approaches. The structuralist theory by Wurzel tries to explain language change based on the 
structure of the system. The layer of markedness is added and language change is subsequently 
defined as reduction of markedness regarding one parameter. Wurzel’s theory is highly 
formalized, which ultimately has to do with the notion of language as a system that abstracts 
away from the speakers. 
In contrast, Keller’s theory of the invisible hand is a speaker-oriented approach to language 
change. In line with the pragmatic view of language, speaking is a way of negotiation. Language 
change is defined as a phenomenon of the third kind: It is the unintended result of intentional 
behavior of the individuals. Specific ecological conditions cause speakers to have similar 
intentions on the microlevel, leading to a change on the macrolevel.   
Unlike any of these, the evolutionary approach by Croft (2000) models language change as 
a case of cultural evolution. It is assumed that language change comes about through the two 
separated mechanisms of variation and selection. Innovations that produce variation are due to 
altered replication. Certain variants are subsequently selected by speakers because they strive 
to identify with a social group. Selection corresponds to the propagation of a change and is 
socially determined; variation is functionally motivated.  
 
47 Zeige’s (2011) attempt to apply Niklas Luhmann’s theory of social systems to language change is 
particularly noteworthy, although it has not received enough attention yet. The theory of complex adaptive systems 
(“chaos theory”) is discussed more lively both by German scholars, e.g. Bülow (2017), Rosenbach (2008), and 




It was shown that any theory of language change relies largely on the definition of language. 
If language is a communicative tool, language change is located in language usage. Keller’s 
theory represents such a functional account of language. The structuralist approach, on the other 
hand, views language as a system that triggers changes by itself. It was argued that these 
approaches provide a different perspective of the problem each, which must be fused in order 
to generate a comprehensive framework. The evolutionary metaphor may represent such a 
framework that stresses the similarities, not the differences between the theories.  
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